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Cuba Fiasco Heightens Pressure for CIA Rein

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By Rowland Evans Jr.
Herald Tribune News Service

The Cuba fiasco has raised the pressure for a congressional check and double-check on operations of the Central Intelligence Agency to an all-time high.

Allen W. Dulles, director of the secret agency, spent almost two hours with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday. The very presence of Dulles evidenced the deep concern about his operations, not just the Cuba affair but CIA activities around the world.

Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and one of the very few who opposed the Cuban operation and took his opposition directly to the President, told reporters after the briefings that the White House and the Defense Department must share in the "collective responsibility" for the "blunder" two weeks ago.

"The operation as a whole was a mistake," Fulbright said. Another member of the committee, Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.), blamed the failure of the expedition partly on "poorly conceived" military action.

White House Disturbed

The White House, it was understood, is exercised by the growing pressure in Congress for a special joint committee on intelligence operations. A proposal proposing

"continuing studies" of the CIA and all other intelligence outfits (except the FBI) was formally introduced in the Senate by Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy (D., Minn.), and other Senators. It is now waiting action in the Rules Committee.

The role of the CIA in the aborted effort to topple Premier Fidel Castro is well known by now, but the Committee itself had never had a briefing. Dulles presumably described the procedures used to train and equip the Cuban refugees, an estimated 5000 of them, in special camps in Central America, how the invasion plans were worked out; disagreements among the refugee groups; and other aspects of the ill-starred action.

Give Candid Accounts

He gave a full and candid account, according to those who heard him, and so did his deputy, Richard Bissell, under whose supervision the Cuban operation was planned.

The great difficulty, meanwhile, in arranging for a formal congressional check on the CIA, and on the intelligence services of the three military branches, is the question: How much check, and how many checkers? In a fundamentally clandestine operation, secrecy is paramount. A 14-member committee, such as McCarthy proposed, would

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presumably have access to intimate secrets and an advance look at operations such as the Cuban landing.

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